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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction against
Alfred William J. Johnson, for Burglary, ^ felony of the second
degree, under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and from
the error in sentencing Mr. Johnson to a separate and consecutive
sentence for the Habitual Criminal Count, a first degree felony,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as amended).

A jury

found Mr. Johnson guilty following a trial on the burglary count,
and after Mr. Johnson waived the jury, the Court found Mr. Johnson
guilty of Being an Habitual Criminal on December 10, 1987, in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for &alt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 29, 1987, John Sargent and his wife,
Eleanor, left their apartment at approximately 1:00 P.M. to go out
for lunch (R. 94 at 20). Their usual procedure when leaving the
apartment together is for Ms. Sargent to lock the door and walk out
ahead of Mr. Sargent who follows her and shuts the door (R. 94 at
20) .

The lock consists of a deadbolt and also a push button in
the middle of the door knob that must be pushed in and twisted in
order for the door to be locked (R. 94 at 20).
Mr. Sargent testified that as they were leaving the
apartment that day he pulled the door shut after seeing his wife
lock the door.

Id.

Mr. Sargent did not remember whether he

specifically checked to make sure the door was secure.

Id.

He did

remember that they did not lock the deadbolt.
At approximately 2:15 p.m. Mr. Sargent dropped his wife
off at the University of Utah for a class, and then returned to
their apartment (R. 94 at 21-22).

As he approached his apartment,

Mr. Sargent noticed that the door was slightly ajar (R. 94 at 22).
He entered the apartment and saw a man, whom he later identified as
Mr. Johnson, standing in the living room (R. 94 at 23). When
Mr. Sargent asked him what he was doing there, Mr. Johnson explained
that he was looking for a man named Steve Goddard and that he was in
the wrong place (R. 94 at 23-24).

He also said that he had not

taken anything and that he would wait for Mr. Sargent to look around
and make sure nothing was missing (R. 94 at 23). Mr. Sargent
testified that during this initial encounter Mr. Johnson was very
calm and conciliatory and wanted to work the situation out before he
left (R. 94 at 35).
Mr. Sargent told the man to stay where he was while he
looked around to see if anything had been taken (R. 94 at 25).
During his thorough inspection of the apartment, Mr. Sargent found
that nothing was missing (R. 94 at 26). He did notice that his
wife's jewelry box was open, but apparently nothing had been taken
- 2
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from the box (R. 94 at 26). Mr. Sargent testified during
cross-examination that he did not notice whether the box was open or
closed when he left the apartment earlier that afternoon (R. 94 at
42) .
In her testimony concerning th0 box, Mrs. Sargent also
testified that she had not "specifically" looked at the box before
she and her husband went to lunch (R. 94 at 48). She further
testified that the box had a thick layer of dust on it, and that
later that afternoon when she looked at the box she noticed what
looked like small round spots on its surface (R. 94 at 49-50).
Concerning the spots, Detective Hutcheson of the Salt Lake City
Police Department testified that no fingerprints could be taken
because the surface of the box was not "appropriate enough for
prints to be lifted" (R. 94 at 55).
When Mr. Sargent had completed his inspection of the
apartment, he suggested that Mr. Johnson empty his pockets (R. 94 at
37).

Mr. Johnson complied and Mr. Sargent testified that he did not

recognize the contents of Mr. Johnson's pockets (R. 94 at 37).
Mr. Sargent also testified that he did not see any type of burglary
tool or even a credit card in Mr. Johnson's possession (R. 94 at
37).

Further, Mr. Johnson gave his first name when Mr. Sargent

requested it (R. 94 at 38). After giving his name, Mr. Johnson
asked if he could leave (R. 94 at 38). Mr. Sargent consented, and
Mr. Johnson walked out of the apartment and down the stairs (R. 94
at 39).
After Mr. Johnson's departure, and prior to calling the
police, Mr. Sargent looked through the apartment again, and found
nothing missing (R. 94 at 40).

Detective Hutcheson testified that based on the
description and name he was given by Mr. Sargent, he compiled a
photo spread from which Mr. Sargent picked out Mr. Johnson (R. 94 at
55-56).

On October 17th, Detective

Hutcheson contacted Mr. Johnson

at the Continental Beauty College and placed him under arrest (R. 94
at 56-57).

At that time Mr. Johnson freely admitted that he had

been in the Sargents' apartment (R. 94 at 58). According to the
detective, Mr. Johnson said it "was all a mistake" and that he had
been looking for a Steve Goddard (R. 94 at 58-59, 63).
After the jury had been sworn, but prior to the
presentation of any evidence, Mr. Johnson made a motion for mistrial
after the judge told the jury the trial was as to both counts, but
then only read one (R. 94 at 9-10, 14). The defense reasoned that
the jury might do "quite a bit of speculating as to why they didn't
hear anything about the second count and what that second count
would be for" (R. 94 at 9-14).

The court denied the motion stating

that the mentioning of the second count was no cause for "any kind
of a speculation on the part of the jury" (R. 94 at 16).
At the conclusion of the state's case Mr. Johnson made a
motion to dismiss based on the paucity of evidence that the state
presented (R. 94 at 64). Mr. Johnson asserted that the state failed
to establish a prima facie case for burglary (R. 94 at 64). He
further specifically asserted that the state presented no evidence
of intent to commit a theft, an essential element of the burglary
charge (R. 94 at 64). Mr. Johnson also contended there was nothing
in the Sargents1 testimony which could indicate "any intent to
commit a theft," especially when considering the testimony along
- 4
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with "Mr. Johnson's demeanor as well as actions while he was in the
apartment" (R. 94 at 64). The Court denied Mr. Johnson's motion to
dismiss (R. 94 at 64).
After being convicted of the second degree burglary, Mr.
Johnson waived the jury for the purposes of determining whether Mr.
Johnson was an habitual criminal (R. 94 at 17). The Court convicted
Mr. Johnson of being an Habitual Criminal (R. 94 at 108).
The court sentenced Mr. Johnson to one to fifteen years
on the burglary conviction and five years to life on the habitual
criminal conviction (R. 94 at 108). The $entences are to be served
consecutively to one another (R. 94 at 108).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing
to grant Mr. Johnson's motion to dismiss after the state failed to
prove intent, an essential element of the crime of burglary.

There

was no evidence of a forced entry at the Sargents1 apartment and Mr.
Johnson did not have any burglary tools or a credit card in his
possession.

Nothing was taken, and Mr. Johnson's demeanor was calm

and conciliatory when confronted by an angry Mr. Sargent.

This

evidence and the surrounding circumstances presented at trial,
cannot be considered as sufficiently pursuasive to justify an
inference of intent.
The trial court also committed error in failing to grant
Mr. Johnson's motion for a mistrial after the court told the jury
there were two charges but then only read one.

- 5
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The court's remark

focused the jury's attention on a matter which they should not have
considered and the jury's verdict was probably influenced by the
remark.
Finally, the trial court erroneously sentenced
Mr. Johnson on the habitual criminal count.

The court sentenced

Mr. Johnson to a separate and consecutive sentence for the habitual
criminal count when the law allows for only an enhancement on the
underlying felonies.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
MR. JOHNSON'S MOTION TO DISMISS AFTER
THE STATE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE AN
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF BURGLARY.
In order to be convicted of the crime of Burglary a
person must (1) enter or remain unlawfully in a building and (2)
have the specific intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended).

In the present case,

the state failed to prove the essential element of intent.
Mr. Johnson, therefore, requests a reversal of the conviction.
To convict Mr. Johnson of the crime charged, the
prosecution must have introduced evidence sufficient to eliminate
all reasonable doubts as to his innocence from the minds of the
jurors.

This basic standard is codified in Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501

(1953 as amended), which states:
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to
be innocent until each element of the offense
charged against him Ls proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. in absence of such proof, the defendant
shall be acquitted.

- 6
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In State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980), Justice
Maughan, dissenting, addressed this undisputed standard with regard
to sufficiency arguments, concluding:
This standard provides the basis for appellate
review of a jury's verdict. While it is the sole
province of the jury to assess the credibility of
the various witnesses and determine the weight of
the evidence, this Court must Review the sufficiency
of the evidence upon which the jury bases its final
determination. If the evidence presented is so
lacking that no reasonable person could conclude it
eliminates all reasonable doubt of the defendant's
guilt then we must set aside the jury verdict.
Id, at 232.
This Court has addressed sufficiency of evidence
requirements on numerous occasions.

In St|ate v. Petree, 659 P.2d

443 (Utah 1983), the Court considered whether there was sufficient
evidence to sustain a jury conviction for the crime of second degree
murder.

Mr. Petree claimed the State failed to prove he

"intentionally and knowingly" caused the c^eath of the victim.

in

considering the appropriate standard of review, the Court stated,
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted}.
(citations omitted).

Id. at 444.

While recognizing that certain deference be granted to
the jury verdict, the Court nevertheless cautioned that,
In fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence
and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict,
the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary
fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean
that the court can take a speculative leap across a
remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. The
- 7
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evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be
sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
(citations omitted).

Id. at 445.

In the present case, the failure of the State to prove
the essential element of intent beyond a reasonable doubt means this
Court must reverse the convictions.

See State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d

48, 51 (Utah 1983) .
In State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), the
defendant was convicted of burglary in a dwelling.

On appeal the

Supreme Court of Utah held that the surrounding circumstances in the
case permitted the inference that the defendant entered the dwelling
with the intent to commit a theft. _Id. at 881. The Court stated:
The act of entering alone does not give rise to an
inference that the actor entered with the requisite
intent to constitute burglary. The intent to commit
a felony, theft, or assault must be proved, or
circumstances shown from which the intent may
reasonably be inferred.
Id. at 881.
The Court went on to explain that in this case"the manner
of entry, the odd hour, and the sudden flight upon being discovered"
all supported the inference "that the required intent to commit
theft or a felony was present."

Id. at 881.

In the present case, there are no surrounding
circumstances from which a reasonable juror could have inferred the
requisite mental state.

The evidence indicated that Mr. Johnson

told Mr. Sargent he entered the apartment by mistake (R. 94 at 24).
Although Mr. Sargent testified that he locked the push button lock,
such a lock is easily left open by mistake.
- 8
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If the Sargents did

lock the door, then there should have been some kind of evidence of
a forced entry, or at least some kind of tool in Mr. Johnson's
possession.

However, Mr. Johnson did not have any burglary tools in

his possession, nor did he have a credit card or any other item
which could be used to pick a lock (R. 94 at 37). The time of day
when Mr. Sargent found Mr. Johnson in the apartment was certainly
not odd (R. 94 at 21-22).
In addition, Mr. Johnson's amiable manner after being
confronted by an angry Mr. Sargent supports the position that
Mr. Johnson simply made an honest mistake (R. 94 at 35-36).

In

addition to Mr. Johnson's amiable manner and reasonable explanation
for his presence in the apartment, Mr. Johnson had no items
belonging to the Sargents in his possession and nothing was missing
from the apartment (R. 94 at 37).
The only substantive evidence against Mr. Johnson is the
disturbance in the dust on the surface of the open jewelry box
(R. 94 at 49-50).

The Sargents do not remember noticing whether the

box was open when they left that day (R. 94 at 26, 48). The police
were not able to lift any prints from the surface of the box (R. 94
at 55). Furthermore, nothing was missing from the box (R. 94 at
26).

A box which may or may not have beer) disturbed, and from which

nothing was taken, does not rise to the level of attendant
circumstances from which a reasonable juror could infer intent to
commit a felony, theft, or assault.

While Mr. Johnson's mere

presence in the apartment arguable may qualify as an unlawful entry,
an unlawful entry on its own will not "support a finding of
intent".

State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 117 (Utah 1986).
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In summary, the substantive evidence and surrounding
circumstances presented at trial, even when considered in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict, cannot be construed as
sufficiently persuasive to justify an inference of intent.

This

Court should therefore reverse the decision of the lower Court and
remand this case for dismissal of the charges.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
MR. JOHNSON'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL AFTER THE
COURT TOLD THE JURY THERE WERE TWO CHARGES BUT
THEN (AFTER A SIDEBAR CONFERENCE) ONLY READ ONE.
During voir dire, while giving a preliminary explanation
of the case to the jury, the judge indicated Mr. Johnson was on
trial for two charges (R. 94 at 9-10).

(See Addendum A for

transcript of the Court's statement and the subsequent motion).
Counsel immediately requested a sidebar conference (R. 94 at 10).
After the conference the judge told the jury that there was "one
count entitled burglary, a second degree felony. . . ." (R. 94 at
10) .
Following the opening statements, Mr. Johnson moved for a
mistrial (R. 94 at 14). He reasoned that the trial court's error in
mentioning the second count would cause the jury to do some
speculating "as to why they didn't hear anything about the second
count and what that second court would be for" (R. 94 at 14). The
prosecution argued that Mr. Johnson was not prejudiced because the
court "did not reveal the nature of the second charge" (R. 94 at
15).

The trial court, in denying the motion, agreed with the

- 10 -

prosecution and offered to make a corrective statement, or if
defense counsel preferred not to call attention to the statement, to
do nothing further (R. 94 at 16). Defense counsel chose the second
option stating that a corrective statement might "further complicate
the matter" (R. 94 at 16).
Speaking of the admissibility of evidence of prior
crimes, this Court stated in State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah
1985), that the limitations on admissibility exist because of "the
tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused because of bad
character rather than because he is shown to be guilty of the
offenses charged."

Id. at 741. The court went on to say that

"because of this tendency, such evidence is presumed prejudicial
and, absent a reason for the admission of the evidence other than to
show criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded".

Id. at 741.

Although the trial court did not indicate that Mr. Johnson had been
convicted of a crime, the comment that there was more than one count
charged probably resulted in speculation by the jury concerning the
nature of the missing count, causing prejudice similar to that
caused by evidence of prior crimes.
In the context of prosecutional misconduct, this Court
has created a test which governs "reversals for improper statements
of counsel"

State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984).

According to the test, the court must first ask whether the remarks
"call to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be
justified in considering in determining their verdict," and second,
whether the jurors "under the circumstances of the particular case,"

- 11 -

were probably influenced by those remarks.

State v. Valdez, 513

P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973).
Although the instant case involves a judge's error in
presenting information to a jury and not prosecutional misconduct,
the test set forth in Troy is applicable by analogy.

The judge

alerted the jury to the fact that a second count existed and the
jury was not determining guilt or innocence on that charge.

The

likely harm to Mr. Johnson as a result of the jury learning this
inadmissible information was a conviction because of bad character
based on the jury's knowledge that Mr. Johnson had other charges
pending, as well as speculation as to what that charge was and the
reason Mr. Johnson was not being tried on that count, rather than
because he was shown to be guilty of the first count.
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).

See State v.

Hence, the first prong of

the Troy test was met in this case.
The second part of the Troy test requires a close look at
the circumstances of the case to determine whether the jury was
"probably influenced by the remark".
426 (Utah 1973).

State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422,

In State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400 (Utah 1986),

the evidence of defendant's knowledge of the illegal use of
electrical power was circumstantial.

Id. at 400.

Thus, when the

prosecution made an improper argument during his closing argument
directing the jury's attention "to the fact that others were
involved in conduct similar to defendant's alleged conduct," the
Supreme Court of Utah reversed and held that considering the
"marginal nature" of the evidence "a reasonable likelihood exists
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that in the absence of the prosecutor's prejudicial argument there
might have been a different result."

Id. at 400/ 403.

The evidence in this case, was less than compelling.
(See discussion infra at 6-9). Mr. Johnson indicated that he was in
the Sargents1 apartment by mistake (R. 94 at 23). The only evidence
which arguably suggested an intent to steal was the testimony
regarding the small spots in the dust on the surface of the open
jewelry box (R. 94 at 49-50).

However, neither Mr. or Mrs. Sargent

could remember whether the box was open or closed when they left for
lunch that day (R. 94 at 42, 48). Where the conclusion of the
jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or evidence
susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater
likelihood that they will be improperly influenced through remarks
of counsel,"

State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984).

The

same is true of an improper remark by the judge.
When, as in this case, there is not "compelling proof of
defendant's guilt," and "the jury could have found either way," (Id.
at 437), the likelihood that the jury was influenced by the
prejudicial remark requires reversal of the conviction and remand
for a new trial.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING
MR. JOHNSON TO A SEPARATE AND CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCE FOR THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL COUNT.
Early in the trial Mr. Johnson agreed to waive the jury
for purposes of determining whether he was an habitual criminal if
he was convicted on Count I, the second degree burglary charge
- 13 -

(R. 94 at 17). Following the guilty verdict on Count I, Mr. Johnson
was tried and found guilty by the Court on Count II, the habitual
criminal charge.

The court sentenced him to one to fifteen years on

the burglary conviction and five years to life on the habitual
criminal conviction (R. 94 at 108). The sentences were to be served
consecutively to one another (R. 94 at 108).
Sentencing Mr. Johnson to a separate and consecutive
sentence based on the conviction for Being an Habitual criminal
violates the statutory provision of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953
as amended), and the protection against double jeopardy contained in
Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution and Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Utah's habitual criminal statute provides as follows:
§76-8-1001. Habitual criminal—Determination.—Any
person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and
committed for felony offenses at least one of which
offenses having been at least a felony of the second
degree or a crime which, if committed within this
state would have been a capitol felony, felony of
the first degree or felony of the second degree, and
was committed to any prison may, upon conviction of
at least a felony of the second degree committed in
this state, other than murder in the first or second
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five years
to life. Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as
amended).
The habitual criminal statute, "does not create a new
crime," rather "it merely enhances punishment."

State v. Bailey,

712 P.2d 281, 286 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Carter, 578 P.2d
1275, 1277 (Utah 1978)).

The statute does not create a separate

offense, "but merely prescribes the consequences to a defendant who
is convicted of a crime after achieving a certain 'status1."

- 14 -

People

v. Early, 692 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).

Since the

Habitual Criminal statute creates no separate offense, no separate
sentence may be justified.

Id. at 1121. The appropriate sanction

is to enhance the sentence on the triggering offense.

As this court

stated in State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1986), "the fact of
the earlier crimes aggravates the commission of the latest crime,
warranting the imposition of a longer sentence."

Id. at 287

(quoting Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting
Increased Sentences for Habitual or Dangerous Criminals, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 356, 361 n. 29 (1975) (citations omitted)).
The sentence given Mr. Johnson by the trial court on the
habitual criminal count is inconsistent with those cases where the
Utah Supreme Court approved enhancement sentences, not a separate
and consecutive sentence.
v. Carter, supra.

E.g., State v. Bailey, supra; and State

Accord State v. Blevins, 697 P.2d 1253, 1258

(Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (ordering trial court to modify sentencing of
persistent violator to a single, indeterminate life term for the
triggering substantive offense); Lopez v. State, 700 P.2d 16, 17
(Idaho 1985) (explaining that since the persistent violator statute
does not create a new crime but only provides for the imposition of
greater punishment for the underlying conviction, the trial court
should not have imposed a separate sentence); and People v. Early,
692 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (habitual criminal
statutes merely substitute a different and more severe sentencing
range than the penalty provided for in the underlying offense and
not a separate sentence.)

- 15 -

In addition to violating the dictates of Utah Code Ann,
§76-8-1001 (1953 as amended), sentencing Mr. Johnson to a separate
and consecutive sentence violates Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitutions.
Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution provides in
pertinent part:
. . . nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense."
Furthermore, Article I, Section 9 provides in part:
" . . . Persons arrested shall not be treated with
unnecessary rigor."
Mr. Johnson's rights guaranteed under those provisions of
the Utah Constitution were violated when the trial court sentenced
him separately and consecutively on the habitual criminal charge.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment provides
in part " . . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, . . . "

Mr. Johnson's

rights under this provision were also violated by the imposition of
a consecutive sentence for the Habitual Criminal charge.
The habitual criminal statutes have survived federal and
state double jeopardy only because they merely enhance the penalty
for the triggering conviction and do not penalize anew for earlier
crimes.

See generally State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 286-87 (Utah

1985), and cases cited therein.

As sentenced in this case, Mr.

Johnson is being punished separately and anew for his past behavior

- 16 -

via the five years to life sentence he received on Count II for the
habitual criminal violation.

The violation of Mr. Johnson's

constitutional rights against double jeopardy is especially visible
where the sentence is run consecutively rather than concurrently
with the triggering offense.

A consecutive sentence will require

that Mr. Johnson be punished in toto for the underlying offense
which allowed for the habitual criminal conviction, before he starts
serving his separate sentence for the habitual criminal count. The
consecutive sentence is not an enhancement.

Rather, it is a

separate and distinct sentence which impermissibly punishes Mr.
Johnson anew for the activity which gave r^Lse to his prior felony
convictions.
Accordingly, this Court should vacate the sentence on the
habitual criminal charge and remand the case to the district court
with an order to correct the illegal sentence to reflect only an
enhancement of the triggering felony and not a separate sentence.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Johnson,
asks this Court to reverse his convictions and to remand this case
for dismissal of the charges or a new trial.

Mr. Johnson also asks

this Court to remand this case to district court with an order to
correct the illegal sentence to reflect only an enhancement of the
triggering felony and not a separate sentence.
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ADDENDUM A

1

qualifications to sit as jurors.)

2

THE COURT:

We need now to ask Counsel to

3

introduce themselves and state the names of their clients,

4

and the witnesses that might be having heard today.

5

MR. IWASAKI:

Your Honor, my name is Glenn

6

Iwasaki, Deputy County Attorney.

7

propose to call to the stand today are present in the

8

courtroom.

9

John Sargent, Elie Sargeant, Detective Hutcheson, and save

The witnesses that I

As I state your name, would you please stand?

10

for rebuttal, those would be the only ones I would have

11

today.

12

THE COURT:

Ms. Harrold?

13

MS. HARROLD:

14

attorney in this case.

My name is Khris Harrold, defense
And we anticipate calling no

15 witnesses, other than the possibility of calling the
16 defendant.
17

THE COURT:

18

MS. HARROLD:

1^ I

THE COURT:

And your client is?
Alfred Johnson.
Thank you.

Do any of you have any

20

knowledge of the facts involved in this case, and in the

21

event you don't know what the case is, let me do that.

22

This case is entitled State of Utah, plaintiff,

*3

vs. Alfred William Johnson, Jr., defendant.

24

That the trial as to both counts, am I not?

25

MR. IWASAKI:

Am I correct?

May we approach the bench, your

11

Honor?

2

THE COURT:

3

(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was

4

held at side bar.)

*
6

You may.

THE COURT:

There is one count entitled burglary,

J a second degree felony, which in general terms, alleges
that a burglary was committed at 1009 Second Avenue,. No. 2,

8

J in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September

9

29th, 1987, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section

10

202 of the Utah Code; and alleges that that crime was

11

committed by the defendant in entering the dwelling of

12 I John Sargent with the intent to commit a theft
"

Is there anybody here that knows anything about

' 4 j this alleged crime or has heard anything about it from any
15

source whatsoever prior to today?

16

raised.

17

(Whereupon, the Judge conducted further voir dire

18

as to who the prospective jurors were, as to their names

19

and occupations, et cetera.)

20

THE COURT:

21

24
25

Do Counsel pass the jury for cause?

MR, IWASAKI:

22
23

There are no hands

State would pass the jury for cause,

your Honor.
j

MS. HARROLD:

D e f e n s e would a l s o p a s s f o r

y o u r Honor.
THE COURT:

M l right.

10

You may tcike y o u r

cause,

1

preemptory challenges.

2

(Whereupon, preemptory challengs were taken by

3

the attorneys at this time.

4

by the clerk.)

5
6

THE COURT:

The panel of jurors were sworn

Does this constitute the jury panel

as chosen?

7

MR. IWASAKI:

It is, your Honor, for the State.

8

MS. HARROLD:

It is for the defense, your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

We'll take a very brief recess and

10

come back, and before we do that, let me give you an

11

admonition each time, and I'm not going to make it as fully

12

as I will make this one.

13

When you leave the Court, you're not to discuss

1*

the case amongst yourselves, I don't want you deciding this

15

case until you have all of the evidence before you, so

1^

clear down to the end of this case, every time you have a

17

break, do not discuss the facts among yourselves, do not

1* I disctiss whether a witness is to be believed or not believed,
19

just don't discuss the case, because you can't make a valid

20

decision until you have all the evidence before you, and

*!

that won't happen until just before Counsel give you their

**

final argument.

*'

before you decide it or attempt to decide it, and wait until

So, wait until all the evidence is in

* 4 I you have had a chance to talk with your fellow jurors in
25

the jury room; because at that time, you're not only free

11

1

to discuss the matter, you should discuss it fully and

2

completely; but wait until then to do it*

3

Secondly, I don't want you to attempt to determine

4

or find any facts out about this case, other than what you

5

will find out in the courtroom here today.

6

you're not in the courtroom, do not discuss the case with

1

any other person, including jurors.

8

to come up and talk to you about it.

9

to, I want you to report it to my bailiff or my clerk or

10

So, when

Don't allow anybody
If anybody attempts

myself.

11

And don't be in a position and try to avoid

12

positions where you might overhear the parties or their

13

witnesses discussing this case.

14

to try and keep their witnesses and their parties in the

15

west end of the hall out here, and in the east end, behind

16

that little short false wall there is some chairs and so

17

on, where the jury can congregate and stay out of the way

18

of the witnesses, so we don't have an intermix of witnesses

19

and parties and attorneys and the jury.

20

I'm going to ask Counsel

Don't discuss this matter with anybody over the

21

telephone, even including your roommates.

22

under your hat until we get it decided, and after that, you

23

C an

24
25

Just keep it

talk to anybody in the world you want to about it.

I

think that will take care of it.
We'll be in recess for about seven minutes.

12

Stay

1

close by.

The bailiff will come and get you and we'll see

2

if we can't get you instructed before the noon break.

3

(Whereupon, the morning recess was taken.)

4

THE COURT:

The record will show that the jury

5

is present in the box.

6

and the State's counsel is present.

1

You may proceed.

8

(Whereupon, opening statements were made at this

9
10
11

Defendant is present with counsel

time by both Counsel.)
THE COURT:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,

we will now recess because there's not time to do anything

12 meaningful before the noon break.
13

This will give you a

few extra minutes, to come back at 1:30 and that will give

14 you that much time again.
15

Remember my admonition and we won't go through

16

it in detail.

But don't try to learn anything about this

17

case from anybody else.

Don't discuss it with anybody,

18 don't allow anybody to discuss it with you, and if you
19

overhear anything inadvertently, please let either the

20

bailiff or my clerk know, and don't make your mind up, or

21

attempt to make any decision in this case until it is

22

finally submitted to you for your decision.

23

The jury will be excused and we'll be in recess

24 until 1:30.
25

(Whereupon, the noon recess was taken.)
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1

THE COURT:

The record should show the jury has

2

not been called back yet.

3

counsel and the State's counsel is present.

4

The defendant is present with

I had previously advised Counsel of my decision

5

on the defendant's motions in limine to the effect that the

6

convictions of the third and fourth convictions, as

7

referred t o —

8 1

MR. IWASAKI:

9

THE COURT:

'81 and '84, your Honor.

Yes.

I felt that those convictions

10

could be properly used for impeachment purposes and not

H

excluded under Rule 609 of the Rules of Evidence.

12

ought to be on the record.

13

Now, you were going to do something?

14

MS. HARROLD:

Yes # your Honor.

That

I have a motion

15

of especially a consideration over tha lunch hour.

16

fact that as we were beginning this morning, that the

17

mention was made of the fact that there were two counts,

18

although what those two counts were were not articulated

19

to the jury.

20

for the jury to do quite a bit of speculation as to why

21

they didn't hear anything about the second count and what

22

that second count would be for.

23
24
25

The

But I think it creates at least a chance

For that reason, we would move for a mistrial
at this point based on that.
MR. IWASAKI:

I think this Court, if it would have

14

1

gone further and read the second count as being that he

2

was charged as a habitual criminal, there would be no

3

basis at all to deny a motion for mistrial; however, under

4

the circumstances as presented to the) Court today, the

5

Court said there were two charges, an£ then I asked to

5

approach the bench.

7

THE COURT:

Then I said something to the effect

8

that I assumed that both were being tpied or something to

9

that effect.

The question being obviously a lot of times,

10

you've got multiple charges and they aren't all going to

11

be tried. Sometimes, it is not clear <£>n the Information

12

that the one to be tried, or which ones are to be tried and

13

which ones are not, and that was the reason I raised the

14

question.

15

MR. IWASAKI:

I think that ihe Court did not

16

reveal the nature of the second charge, and that the jury

17

not knowing, that speculation aside, has no basis on which

18

to have any prejudice against the defendant for the

19

stating of the second charge, that of(being an habitual

20

criminal.

21

in this matter.

22

And that wasn't done, and so there is no error

THE COURT:

I think that's true.

Now, if the

23

defense feels that in any way it wants any kind of a

24

corrective statement or instruction to be made, I'll be

25

glad to do that.

If, on the other hand, you feel the Court

15

1

has committed error and you feel you want to leave it in

2

for purpose of appeal, you can leave it,

3

there was any harm done.

4

than one charge could have been—really, it is not the

5

basis for any kind of a speculation on the part of the jury

6

in this case, particularly when we get through trying,

7

because all we will have talked about here is the particular

8

charge involved.

9

is anything else involved.

JO
11

I don't think

The fact that there was more

Been no indication whatsoever that there

As a matter of fact, the purpose of this trial,
there isn't—

12

MS. HARROLD:

My preference would be to stand on

13

the motion I just made and not ask the Court for a

14

corrective statement that may only further complicate the

15

matter.

16

THE COURT:

17

give you the option.

18

That could well do.

MS. HARROLD:

That's why I

That would be my preference.

I

19

still think, if I make a bad deal of this case, it's going

20

to be based on the jury being asked to speculate about

21

several things.

22

necessary and certainly wasn't warranted may occur because

23

of that statement, and again, I would renew my motion.

24
25

The idea that further speculation is not

THE COURT:

Well, I suppose Mr. Iwasaki has to

defend this record on appeal, and if he doesn't really feel

16

1

that it's a problem, I frankly don't think there was any

2

error committed.

So, I'm going to deny that motion.

3

Very well, anything else?

4

MR. IWASAKI:

One other matter, in the event that

5

there is a conviction resulting from the burglary, second

6

degree, it's my understanding that Ms. Harrold, on behalf

7

of Mr. Johnson, will waive the jury for the purposes of

8

determining whether or not he was a habitual criminal, at

9

that time.

10

MS. HARROLD:

That's correct|, your Honor.

11

would, if that in fact occurs.

12

THE COURT:

13

All right.

Anything further out of

the presence of the jury?

14

MS. HARROLD:

Nothing at this time.

15

MR. IWASAKI:

Nothing.

16

THE COURT:

17

Will the bailiff bring the jury in,

please?

18
19

We

THe record will show that the jury is in the
box and we're ready to proceed.

20

The State ready?

21

MR. IWASAKI:

22

THE COURT:

23 I

MS. HARROLD:

State is, your Honor.
You may call yodr first witness.
Your Honor, before we begin the

24

evidence, I would move to invoke the exclusionary rule at

25

this time.
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